Filtered by vendor Polkadot
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3 CVE
CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2025-54426 | 1 Polkadot | 1 Frontier | 2025-07-29 | N/A |
Polkadot Frontier is an Ethereum and EVM compatibility layer for Polkadot and Substrate. In versions prior to commit 36f70d1, the Curve25519Add and Curve25519ScalarMul precompiles incorrectly handle invalid Ristretto point representations. Instead of returning an error, they silently treat invalid input bytes as the Ristretto identity element, leading to potentially incorrect cryptographic results. This is fixed in commit 36f70d1. | ||||
CVE-2025-54429 | 1 Polkadot | 1 Frontier | 2025-07-29 | N/A |
Polkadot Frontier is an Ethereum and EVM compatibility layer for Polkadot and Substrate. There are various account address types in Frontier, e.g. precompiled contracts, smart contracts, and externally owned accounts. Some EVM mechanisms should be unreachable by certain types of accounts for safety. For precompiles to be callable by smart contracts they must be explicitly configured as CallableByContract. If this configuration is absent, then the precompile should be unreachable via smart contract accounts. In commits prior to 0822030, the underlying implementation of CallableByContract which returned the AddressType was incorrect. It considered the contract address running under CREATE or CREATE2 to be AddressType::EOA rather than correctly as AddressType::Contract. The issue only affects users who use custom precompile implementations that utilize AddressType::EOA and AddressType::Contract. It's not directly exploitable in any of the predefined precompiles in Frontier. This is fixed in version 0822030. | ||||
CVE-2025-54427 | 1 Polkadot | 1 Frontier | 2025-07-29 | N/A |
Polkadot Frontier is an Ethereum and EVM compatibility layer for Polkadot and Substrate. The extrinsic note_min_gas_price_target is an inherent extrinsic, meaning only the block producer can call it. To ensure correctness, the ProvideInherent trait should be implemented for each inherent, which includes the check_inherent call. This allows other nodes to verify if the input (in this case, the target value) is correct. However, prior to commit a754b3d, the check_inherent function has not been implemented for note_min_gas_price_target. This lets the block producer set the target value without verification. The target is then used to set the MinGasPrice, which has an upper and lower bound defined in the on_initialize hook. The block producer can set the target to the upper bound. Which also increases the upper and lower bounds for the next block. Over time, this could result in continuously raising the gas price, making contract execution too expensive and ineffective for users. An attacker could use this flaw to manipulate the gas price, potentially leading to significantly inflated transaction fees. Such manipulation could render contract execution prohibitively expensive for users, effectively resulting in a denial-of-service condition for the network. This is fixed in version a754b3d. |
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