RISC Zero is a zero-knowledge verifiable general computing platform, with Ethereum integration. The risc0-ethereum repository contains Solidity verifier contracts, Steel EVM view call library, and supporting code. Prior to versions 2.1.1 and 2.2.0, the `Steel.validateCommitment` Solidity library function will return `true` for a crafted commitment with a digest value of zero. This violates the semantics of `validateCommitment`, as this does not commitment to a block that is in the current chain. Because the digest is zero, it does not correspond to any block and there exist no known openings. As a result, this commitment will never be produced by a correct zkVM guest using Steel and leveraging this bug to compromise the soundness of a program using Steel would require a separate bug or misuse of the Steel library, which is expected to be used to validate the root of state opening proofs. A fix has been released as part of `risc0-ethereum` 2.1.1 and 2.2.0. Users for the `Steel` Solidity library versions 2.1.0 or earlier should ensure they are using `Steel.validateCommitment` in tandem with zkVM proof verification of a Steel program, as shown in the ERC-20 counter example, and documentation. This is the correct usage of Steel, and users following this pattern are not at risk, and do not need to take action. Users not verifying a zkVM proof of a Steel program should update their application to do so, as this is incorrect usage of Steel.
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Tue, 24 Jun 2025 21:15:00 +0000
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Description | RISC Zero is a zero-knowledge verifiable general computing platform, with Ethereum integration. The risc0-ethereum repository contains Solidity verifier contracts, Steel EVM view call library, and supporting code. Prior to versions 2.1.1 and 2.2.0, the `Steel.validateCommitment` Solidity library function will return `true` for a crafted commitment with a digest value of zero. This violates the semantics of `validateCommitment`, as this does not commitment to a block that is in the current chain. Because the digest is zero, it does not correspond to any block and there exist no known openings. As a result, this commitment will never be produced by a correct zkVM guest using Steel and leveraging this bug to compromise the soundness of a program using Steel would require a separate bug or misuse of the Steel library, which is expected to be used to validate the root of state opening proofs. A fix has been released as part of `risc0-ethereum` 2.1.1 and 2.2.0. Users for the `Steel` Solidity library versions 2.1.0 or earlier should ensure they are using `Steel.validateCommitment` in tandem with zkVM proof verification of a Steel program, as shown in the ERC-20 counter example, and documentation. This is the correct usage of Steel, and users following this pattern are not at risk, and do not need to take action. Users not verifying a zkVM proof of a Steel program should update their application to do so, as this is incorrect usage of Steel. | |
Title | risc0-ethereum-contracts allows invalid commitment with digest value of zero to be accepted by Steel.validateCommitment | |
Weaknesses | CWE-159 | |
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published: 2025-06-24T20:20:17.287Z
Updated: 2025-06-24T20:49:13.684Z
Reserved: 2025-06-20T17:42:25.708Z
Link: CVE-2025-52884

Updated: 2025-06-24T20:49:08.398Z

Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2025-06-24T21:15:26.207
Modified: 2025-06-26T18:58:14.280
Link: CVE-2025-52884

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