In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length). Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.
History

Sat, 06 Sep 2025 09:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel

Sat, 06 Sep 2025 00:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.0, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}

threat_severity

Important


Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length). Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.
Title tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list
References

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published: 2025-09-05T17:20:48.657Z

Updated: 2025-09-05T17:20:48.657Z

Reserved: 2025-04-16T07:20:57.113Z

Link: CVE-2025-39682

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2025-09-05T18:15:44.670

Modified: 2025-09-08T16:25:38.810

Link: CVE-2025-39682

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Important

Publid Date: 2025-09-05T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2025-39682 - Bugzilla