{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.1", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2022-49658", "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "Linux", "dateReserved": "2025-02-26T02:21:30.434Z", "datePublished": "2025-02-26T02:23:56.922Z", "dateUpdated": "2025-05-04T08:42:44.420Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"providerMetadata": {"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "shortName": "Linux", "dateUpdated": "2025-05-04T08:42:44.420Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix insufficient bounds propagation from adjust_scalar_min_max_vals\n\nKuee reported a corner case where the tnum becomes constant after the call\nto __reg_bound_offset(), but the register's bounds are not, that is, its\nmin bounds are still not equal to the register's max bounds.\n\nThis in turn allows to leak pointers through turning a pointer register as\nis into an unknown scalar via adjust_ptr_min_max_vals().\n\nBefore:\n\n func#0 @0\n 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n 0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))\n 1: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n 2: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()\n 3: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()\n 4: (47) r3 |= 32767 ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)\n 5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)\n 6: (95) exit\n\n from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n 7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1 ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)\n 8: (95) exit\n\n from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n 9: (07) r3 += -32767 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) <--- [*]\n 10: (95) exit\n\nWhat can be seen here is that R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff;\n0x8000)) after the operation R3 += -32767 results in a 'malformed' constant, that\nis, R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)). Intersecting with var_off has\nnot been done at that point via __update_reg_bounds(), which would have improved\nthe umax to be equal to umin.\n\nRefactor the tnum <> min/max bounds information flow into a reg_bounds_sync()\nhelper and use it consistently everywhere. After the fix, bounds have been\ncorrected to R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) and thus the register\nis regarded as a 'proper' constant scalar of 0.\n\nAfter:\n\n func#0 @0\n 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n 0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))\n 1: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n 2: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()\n 3: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()\n 4: (47) r3 |= 32767 ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)\n 5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)\n 6: (95) exit\n\n from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n 7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1 ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)\n 8: (95) exit\n\n from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0\n---truncated---"}], "affected": [{"product": "Linux", "vendor": "Linux", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git", "programFiles": ["kernel/bpf/verifier.c"], "versions": [{"version": "b03c9f9fdc37dab81ea04d5dacdc5995d4c224c2", "lessThan": "e917be1f83ea14a68b3cf64d3da9968eaf991dae", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git"}, {"version": "b03c9f9fdc37dab81ea04d5dacdc5995d4c224c2", "lessThan": "a7de8d436db92bab8b1f44624297c2554a6ac36b", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git"}, {"version": "b03c9f9fdc37dab81ea04d5dacdc5995d4c224c2", "lessThan": "b2a28bb36664c94375926cbbb91976242847699d", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git"}, {"version": "b03c9f9fdc37dab81ea04d5dacdc5995d4c224c2", "lessThan": "3844d153a41adea718202c10ae91dc96b37453b5", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git"}]}, {"product": "Linux", "vendor": "Linux", "defaultStatus": "affected", "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git", "programFiles": ["kernel/bpf/verifier.c"], "versions": [{"version": "4.14", "status": "affected"}, {"version": "0", "lessThan": "4.14", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver"}, {"version": "5.10.130", "lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver"}, {"version": "5.15.54", "lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver"}, {"version": "5.18.11", "lessThanOrEqual": "5.18.*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver"}, {"version": "5.19", "lessThanOrEqual": "*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"}]}], "cpeApplicability": [{"nodes": [{"operator": "OR", "negate": false, "cpeMatch": [{"vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "4.14", "versionEndExcluding": "5.10.130"}, {"vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "4.14", "versionEndExcluding": "5.15.54"}, {"vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "4.14", "versionEndExcluding": "5.18.11"}, {"vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "4.14", "versionEndExcluding": "5.19"}]}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e917be1f83ea14a68b3cf64d3da9968eaf991dae"}, {"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7de8d436db92bab8b1f44624297c2554a6ac36b"}, {"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2a28bb36664c94375926cbbb91976242847699d"}, {"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3844d153a41adea718202c10ae91dc96b37453b5"}], "title": "bpf: Fix insufficient bounds propagation from adjust_scalar_min_max_vals", "x_generator": {"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"}}}}

{}

{"cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix insufficient bounds propagation from adjust_scalar_min_max_vals\n\nKuee reported a corner case where the tnum becomes constant after the call\nto __reg_bound_offset(), but the register's bounds are not, that is, its\nmin bounds are still not equal to the register's max bounds.\n\nThis in turn allows to leak pointers through turning a pointer register as\nis into an unknown scalar via adjust_ptr_min_max_vals().\n\nBefore:\n\n func#0 @0\n 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n 0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))\n 1: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n 2: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()\n 3: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()\n 4: (47) r3 |= 32767 ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)\n 5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)\n 6: (95) exit\n\n from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n 7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1 ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)\n 8: (95) exit\n\n from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n 9: (07) r3 += -32767 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) <--- [*]\n 10: (95) exit\n\nWhat can be seen here is that R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff;\n0x8000)) after the operation R3 += -32767 results in a 'malformed' constant, that\nis, R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)). Intersecting with var_off has\nnot been done at that point via __update_reg_bounds(), which would have improved\nthe umax to be equal to umin.\n\nRefactor the tnum <> min/max bounds information flow into a reg_bounds_sync()\nhelper and use it consistently everywhere. After the fix, bounds have been\ncorrected to R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) and thus the register\nis regarded as a 'proper' constant scalar of 0.\n\nAfter:\n\n func#0 @0\n 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n 0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))\n 1: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n 2: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()\n 3: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()\n 4: (47) r3 |= 32767 ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)\n 5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)\n 6: (95) exit\n\n from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n 7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1 ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)\n 8: (95) exit\n\n from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0\n---truncated---"}], "id": "CVE-2022-49658", "lastModified": "2025-02-26T07:01:40.867", "metrics": {}, "published": "2025-02-26T07:01:40.867", "references": [{"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3844d153a41adea718202c10ae91dc96b37453b5"}, {"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7de8d436db92bab8b1f44624297c2554a6ac36b"}, {"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2a28bb36664c94375926cbbb91976242847699d"}, {"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e917be1f83ea14a68b3cf64d3da9968eaf991dae"}], "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "vulnStatus": "Received"}

{"bugzilla": {"description": "kernel: bpf: Fix insufficient bounds propagation from adjust_scalar_min_max_vals", "id": "2347716", "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2347716"}, "csaw": false, "cvss3": {"cvss3_base_score": "6.0", "cvss3_scoring_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H", "status": "draft"}, "cwe": "CWE-401", "details": ["In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\nbpf: Fix insufficient bounds propagation from adjust_scalar_min_max_vals\nKuee reported a corner case where the tnum becomes constant after the call\nto __reg_bound_offset(), but the register's bounds are not, that is, its\nmin bounds are still not equal to the register's max bounds.\nThis in turn allows to leak pointers through turning a pointer register as\nis into an unknown scalar via adjust_ptr_min_max_vals().\nBefore:\nfunc#0 @0\n0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))\n1: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n2: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()\n3: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()\n4: (47) r3 |= 32767 ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)\n5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)\n6: (95) exit\nfrom 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1 ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)\n8: (95) exit\nfrom 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n9: (07) r3 += -32767 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) <--- [*]\n10: (95) exit\nWhat can be seen here is that R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff;\n0x8000)) after the operation R3 += -32767 results in a 'malformed' constant, that\nis, R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)). Intersecting with var_off has\nnot been done at that point via __update_reg_bounds(), which would have improved\nthe umax to be equal to umin.\nRefactor the tnum <> min/max bounds information flow into a reg_bounds_sync()\nhelper and use it consistently everywhere. After the fix, bounds have been\ncorrected to R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) and thus the register\nis regarded as a 'proper' constant scalar of 0.\nAfter:\nfunc#0 @0\n0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))\n1: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n2: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()\n3: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()\n4: (47) r3 |= 32767 ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)\n5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)\n6: (95) exit\nfrom 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))\n7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1 ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)\n8: (95) exit\nfrom 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0\n---truncated---", "An out-of-bounds vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel. The tnum becomes constant after the call to __reg_bound_offset(), but the register's bounds are not. Its min bounds are still not equal to the register's max bounds, disrupting the system's availability."], "mitigation": {"lang": "en:us", "value": "Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability."}, "name": "CVE-2022-49658", "package_state": [{"cpe": "cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:6", "fix_state": "Not affected", "package_name": "kernel", "product_name": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6"}, {"cpe": "cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:7", "fix_state": "Out of support scope", "package_name": "kernel", "product_name": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7"}, {"cpe": "cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:7", "fix_state": "Out of support scope", "package_name": "kernel-rt", "product_name": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7"}, {"cpe": "cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:8", "fix_state": "Out of support scope", "package_name": "kernel", "product_name": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8"}, {"cpe": "cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:8", "fix_state": "Out of support scope", "package_name": "kernel-rt", "product_name": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8"}, {"cpe": "cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:9", "fix_state": "Affected", "package_name": "kernel", "product_name": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9"}, {"cpe": "cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:9", "fix_state": "Affected", "package_name": "kernel-rt", "product_name": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9"}], "public_date": "2025-02-26T00:00:00Z", "references": ["https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-49658\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49658\nhttps://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/2025022621-CVE-2022-49658-37f3@gregkh/T"], "statement": "The default Red Hat Enterprise Linux kernel prevents unprivileged users from being able to use eBPF by the kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl. This issue would require a privileged user with CAP_SYS_ADMIN or root to be able to abuse this flaw reducing its attack space.\nFor Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 to confirm the current state, inspect the sysctl with the command:\ncat /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled\nThe setting of 1 would mean that unprivileged users cannot use eBPF, mitigating the flaw.", "threat_severity": "Moderate"}