The path in this case is a little bit convoluted. The end result is that via an ioctl an untrusted app can control the ui32PageIndex offset in the expression:sPA.uiAddr = page_to_phys(psOSPageArrayData->pagearray[ui32PageIndex]);With the current PoC this crashes as an OOB read. However, given that the OOB read value is ending up as the address field of a struct I think i seems plausible that this could lead to an OOB write if the attacker is able to cause the OOB read to pull an interesting kernel address. Regardless if this is a read or write, it is a High severity issue in the kernel.Product: AndroidVersions: Android SoCAndroid ID: A-238904312
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
References
Link | Providers |
---|---|
https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2022-09-01 |
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History
No history.

Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: google_android
Published: 2022-09-13T19:13:39
Updated: 2024-08-03T15:55:17.580Z
Reserved: 2020-11-06T00:00:00
Link: CVE-2021-0942

No data.

Status : Modified
Published: 2022-09-13T20:15:08.983
Modified: 2024-11-21T05:43:17.090
Link: CVE-2021-0942

No data.