Total
301555 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-38248 | 2025-07-10 | 7.0 High | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bridge: mcast: Fix use-after-free during router port configuration The bridge maintains a global list of ports behind which a multicast router resides. The list is consulted during forwarding to ensure multicast packets are forwarded to these ports even if the ports are not member in the matching MDB entry. When per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled, the per-port multicast context is disabled on each port and the port is removed from the global router port list: # ip link add name br1 up type bridge vlan_filtering 1 mcast_snooping 1 # ip link add name dummy1 up master br1 type dummy # ip link set dev dummy1 type bridge_slave mcast_router 2 $ bridge -d mdb show | grep router router ports on br1: dummy1 # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_vlan_snooping 1 $ bridge -d mdb show | grep router However, the port can be re-added to the global list even when per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled: # ip link set dev dummy1 type bridge_slave mcast_router 0 # ip link set dev dummy1 type bridge_slave mcast_router 2 $ bridge -d mdb show | grep router router ports on br1: dummy1 Since commit 4b30ae9adb04 ("net: bridge: mcast: re-implement br_multicast_{enable, disable}_port functions"), when per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled, multicast disablement on a port will disable the per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts and not the per-port one. As a result, a port will remain in the global router port list even after it is deleted. This will lead to a use-after-free [1] when the list is traversed (when adding a new port to the list, for example): # ip link del dev dummy1 # ip link add name dummy2 up master br1 type dummy # ip link set dev dummy2 type bridge_slave mcast_router 2 Similarly, stale entries can also be found in the per-VLAN router port list. When per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled, the per-{port, VLAN} contexts are disabled on each port and the port is removed from the per-VLAN router port list: # ip link add name br1 up type bridge vlan_filtering 1 mcast_snooping 1 mcast_vlan_snooping 1 # ip link add name dummy1 up master br1 type dummy # bridge vlan add vid 2 dev dummy1 # bridge vlan global set vid 2 dev br1 mcast_snooping 1 # bridge vlan set vid 2 dev dummy1 mcast_router 2 $ bridge vlan global show dev br1 vid 2 | grep router router ports: dummy1 # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_vlan_snooping 0 $ bridge vlan global show dev br1 vid 2 | grep router However, the port can be re-added to the per-VLAN list even when per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled: # bridge vlan set vid 2 dev dummy1 mcast_router 0 # bridge vlan set vid 2 dev dummy1 mcast_router 2 $ bridge vlan global show dev br1 vid 2 | grep router router ports: dummy1 When the VLAN is deleted from the port, the per-{port, VLAN} multicast context will not be disabled since multicast snooping is not enabled on the VLAN. As a result, the port will remain in the per-VLAN router port list even after it is no longer member in the VLAN. This will lead to a use-after-free [2] when the list is traversed (when adding a new port to the list, for example): # ip link add name dummy2 up master br1 type dummy # bridge vlan add vid 2 dev dummy2 # bridge vlan del vid 2 dev dummy1 # bridge vlan set vid 2 dev dummy2 mcast_router 2 Fix these issues by removing the port from the relevant (global or per-VLAN) router port list in br_multicast_port_ctx_deinit(). The function is invoked during port deletion with the per-port multicast context and during VLAN deletion with the per-{port, VLAN} multicast context. Note that deleting the multicast router timer is not enough as it only takes care of the temporary multicast router states (1 or 3) and not the permanent one (2). [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in br_multicast_add_router.part.0+0x3f1/0x560 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888004a67328 by task ip/384 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2025-38268 | 2025-07-10 | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm: move tcpm_queue_vdm_unlocked to asynchronous work A state check was previously added to tcpm_queue_vdm_unlocked to prevent a deadlock where the DisplayPort Alt Mode driver would be executing work and attempting to grab the tcpm_lock while the TCPM was holding the lock and attempting to unregister the altmode, blocking on the altmode driver's cancel_work_sync call. Because the state check isn't protected, there is a small window where the Alt Mode driver could determine that the TCPM is in a ready state and attempt to grab the lock while the TCPM grabs the lock and changes the TCPM state to one that causes the deadlock. The callstack is provided below: [110121.667392][ C7] Call trace: [110121.667396][ C7] __switch_to+0x174/0x338 [110121.667406][ C7] __schedule+0x608/0x9f0 [110121.667414][ C7] schedule+0x7c/0xe8 [110121.667423][ C7] kernfs_drain+0xb0/0x114 [110121.667431][ C7] __kernfs_remove+0x16c/0x20c [110121.667436][ C7] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x74/0xe8 [110121.667442][ C7] sysfs_remove_group+0x84/0xe8 [110121.667450][ C7] sysfs_remove_groups+0x34/0x58 [110121.667458][ C7] device_remove_groups+0x10/0x20 [110121.667464][ C7] device_release_driver_internal+0x164/0x2e4 [110121.667475][ C7] device_release_driver+0x18/0x28 [110121.667484][ C7] bus_remove_device+0xec/0x118 [110121.667491][ C7] device_del+0x1e8/0x4ac [110121.667498][ C7] device_unregister+0x18/0x38 [110121.667504][ C7] typec_unregister_altmode+0x30/0x44 [110121.667515][ C7] tcpm_reset_port+0xac/0x370 [110121.667523][ C7] tcpm_snk_detach+0x84/0xb8 [110121.667529][ C7] run_state_machine+0x4c0/0x1b68 [110121.667536][ C7] tcpm_state_machine_work+0x94/0xe4 [110121.667544][ C7] kthread_worker_fn+0x10c/0x244 [110121.667552][ C7] kthread+0x104/0x1d4 [110121.667557][ C7] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [110121.667689][ C7] Workqueue: events dp_altmode_work [110121.667697][ C7] Call trace: [110121.667701][ C7] __switch_to+0x174/0x338 [110121.667710][ C7] __schedule+0x608/0x9f0 [110121.667717][ C7] schedule+0x7c/0xe8 [110121.667725][ C7] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x24/0x40 [110121.667733][ C7] __mutex_lock+0x408/0xdac [110121.667741][ C7] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x14/0x24 [110121.667748][ C7] mutex_lock+0x40/0xec [110121.667757][ C7] tcpm_altmode_enter+0x78/0xb4 [110121.667764][ C7] typec_altmode_enter+0xdc/0x10c [110121.667769][ C7] dp_altmode_work+0x68/0x164 [110121.667775][ C7] process_one_work+0x1e4/0x43c [110121.667783][ C7] worker_thread+0x25c/0x430 [110121.667789][ C7] kthread+0x104/0x1d4 [110121.667794][ C7] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Change tcpm_queue_vdm_unlocked to queue for tcpm_queue_vdm_work, which can perform the state check while holding the TCPM lock while the Alt Mode lock is no longer held. This requires a new struct to hold the vdm data, altmode_vdm_event. | ||||
| CVE-2025-38323 | 2025-07-10 | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: atm: add lec_mutex syzbot found its way in net/atm/lec.c, and found an error path in lecd_attach() could leave a dangling pointer in dev_lec[]. Add a mutex to protect dev_lecp[] uses from lecd_attach(), lec_vcc_attach() and lec_mcast_attach(). Following patch will use this mutex for /proc/net/atm/lec. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lecd_attach net/atm/lec.c:751 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lane_ioctl+0x2224/0x23e0 net/atm/lec.c:1008 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807c7b8e68 by task syz.1.17/6142 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6142 Comm: syz.1.17 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-syzkaller-00239-g08215f5486ec #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline] print_report+0xcd/0x680 mm/kasan/report.c:521 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:634 lecd_attach net/atm/lec.c:751 [inline] lane_ioctl+0x2224/0x23e0 net/atm/lec.c:1008 do_vcc_ioctl+0x12c/0x930 net/atm/ioctl.c:159 sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1190 sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1311 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x4c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Allocated by task 6132: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4328 [inline] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x27b/0x620 mm/slub.c:5015 alloc_netdev_mqs+0xd2/0x1570 net/core/dev.c:11711 lecd_attach net/atm/lec.c:737 [inline] lane_ioctl+0x17db/0x23e0 net/atm/lec.c:1008 do_vcc_ioctl+0x12c/0x930 net/atm/ioctl.c:159 sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1190 sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1311 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x4c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 6132: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x51/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4643 [inline] kfree+0x2b4/0x4d0 mm/slub.c:4842 free_netdev+0x6c5/0x910 net/core/dev.c:11892 lecd_attach net/atm/lec.c:744 [inline] lane_ioctl+0x1ce8/0x23e0 net/atm/lec.c:1008 do_vcc_ioctl+0x12c/0x930 net/atm/ioctl.c:159 sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1190 sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1311 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:893 | ||||
| CVE-2025-53655 | 2025-07-10 | 5.3 Medium | ||
| Jenkins Statistics Gatherer Plugin 2.0.3 and earlier does not mask the AWS Secret Key on the global configuration form, increasing the potential for attackers to observe and capture it. | ||||
| CVE-2025-7381 | 2025-07-10 | 5.3 Medium | ||
| ImpactThis is an information disclosure vulnerability originating from PHP's base image. This vulnerability exposes the PHP version through an X-Powered-By header, which attackers could exploit to fingerprint the server and identify potential weaknesses. WorkaroundsThe mitigation requires changing the expose_php variable from "On" to "Off" in the file located at /usr/local/etc/php/php.ini. | ||||
| CVE-2025-1112 | 1 Ibm | 1 Openpages With Watson | 2025-07-10 | 4.3 Medium |
| IBM OpenPages with Watson 8.3 and 9.0 could allow an authenticated user to obtain sensitive information that should only be available to privileged users. | ||||
| CVE-2025-38345 | 2025-07-10 | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPICA: fix acpi operand cache leak in dswstate.c ACPICA commit 987a3b5cf7175916e2a4b6ea5b8e70f830dfe732 I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case. When early termination occurs due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak. Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows: >[ 0.585957] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device) >[ 0.587218] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device) >[ 0.588530] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions) >[ 0.589790] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device) >[ 0.591534] ACPI Error: Illegal I/O port address/length above 64K: C806E00000004002/0x2 (20170303/hwvalid-155) >[ 0.594351] ACPI Exception: AE_LIMIT, Unable to initialize fixed events (20170303/evevent-88) >[ 0.597858] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter >[ 0.599162] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281) >[ 0.601836] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects >[ 0.603556] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 #26 >[ 0.605159] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS virtual_box 12/01/2006 >[ 0.609177] Call Trace: >[ 0.610063] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81 >[ 0.611118] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0 >[ 0.612632] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 >[ 0.613906] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10 >[ 0.617986] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b >[ 0.619293] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14 >[ 0.620394] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f >[ 0.621616] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80 >[ 0.623412] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f >[ 0.624585] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 >[ 0.625861] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0 >[ 0.627513] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f >[ 0.628972] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 >[ 0.630043] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100 >[ 0.631084] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 >[ 0.633343] vgaarb: loaded >[ 0.635036] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0 >[ 0.638601] PCI: Probing PCI hardware >[ 0.639833] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00 >[ 0.641031] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [io 0x0000-0xffff] > ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ... I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_ delete() function miscalculated the top of the stack. acpi_ds_obj_stack_push() function uses walk_state->operand_index for start position of the top, but acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_delete() function considers index 0 for it. Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak. This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR. I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak. | ||||
| CVE-2021-27961 | 2025-07-10 | 6.5 Medium | ||
| evesys 7.1 (2152) through 8.0 (2202) allows Reflected XSS via the indexeva.php action parameter. | ||||
| CVE-2023-50458 | 2025-07-10 | 3.5 Low | ||
| In Dradis before 4.11.0, the Output Console shows a job queue that may contain information about other users' jobs. | ||||
| CVE-2025-2670 | 1 Ibm | 1 Openpages With Watson | 2025-07-10 | 4.3 Medium |
| IBM OpenPages 9.0 is vulnerable to information disclosure of sensitive information due to a weaker than expected security for certain REST end points related to workflow feature of OpenPages. An authenticated user is able to obtain certain information about Workflow related configuration and internal state. | ||||
| CVE-2025-35983 | 2025-07-10 | 6.5 Medium | ||
| Improper Certificate Validation (CWE-295) in the Controller 7000 OneLink implementation could allow an unprivileged attacker to perform a limited denial of service or perform privileged overrides during the initial configuration of the Controller, there is no risk for Controllers once they are connected. This issue affects Controller 7000: 9.30 prior to vCR9.30.250624a (distributed in 9.30.1871 (MR1)). | ||||
| CVE-2025-38238 | 2025-07-10 | 5.5 Medium | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: fnic: Fix crash in fnic_wq_cmpl_handler when FDMI times out When both the RHBA and RPA FDMI requests time out, fnic reuses a frame to send ABTS for each of them. On send completion, this causes an attempt to free the same frame twice that leads to a crash. Fix crash by allocating separate frames for RHBA and RPA, and modify ABTS logic accordingly. Tested by checking MDS for FDMI information. Tested by using instrumented driver to: - Drop PLOGI response - Drop RHBA response - Drop RPA response - Drop RHBA and RPA response - Drop PLOGI response + ABTS response - Drop RHBA response + ABTS response - Drop RPA response + ABTS response - Drop RHBA and RPA response + ABTS response for both of them | ||||
| CVE-2025-38244 | 2025-07-10 | 7.0 High | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix potential deadlock when reconnecting channels Fix cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect() to take the correct lock order and prevent the following deadlock from happening ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc3-build2+ #1301 Tainted: G S W ------------------------------------------------------ cifsd/6055 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810ad56038 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200 but task is already holding lock: ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270 __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780 lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0 _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 cifs_setup_session+0x81/0x4b0 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x771/0x900 cifs_mount_get_session+0x7e/0x170 cifs_mount+0x92/0x2d0 cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x161/0x460 smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90 vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180 do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0 path_mount+0x6ee/0x740 do_mount+0x98/0xe0 __do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270 __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780 lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0 _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 cifs_match_super+0x101/0x320 sget+0xab/0x270 cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x1e0/0x460 smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90 vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180 do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0 path_mount+0x6ee/0x740 do_mount+0x98/0xe0 __do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_noncircular+0x95/0xc0 check_prev_add+0x115/0x2f0 validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270 __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780 lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0 _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200 __cifs_reconnect+0x8f/0x500 cifs_handle_standard+0x112/0x280 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x64d/0xbc0 kthread+0x2f7/0x310 ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x230 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &tcp_ses->srv_lock --> &ret_buf->ses_lock --> &ret_buf->chan_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock); lock(&ret_buf->ses_lock); lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock); lock(&tcp_ses->srv_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by cifsd/6055: #0: ffffffff857de398 (&cifs_tcp_ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x7b/0x200 #1: ffff888119c64060 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x9c/0x200 #2: ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200 | ||||
| CVE-2025-38252 | 2025-07-10 | 5.5 Medium | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/ras: Fix CPER handler device confusion By inspection, cxl_cper_handle_prot_err() is making a series of fragile assumptions that can lead to crashes: 1/ It assumes that endpoints identified in the record are a CXL-type-3 device, nothing guarantees that. 2/ It assumes that the device is bound to the cxl_pci driver, nothing guarantees that. 3/ Minor, it holds the device lock over the switch-port tracing for no reason as the trace is 100% generated from data in the record. Correct those by checking that the PCIe endpoint parents a cxl_memdev before assuming the format of the driver data, and move the lock to where it is required. Consequently this also makes the implementation ready for CXL accelerators that are not bound to cxl_pci. | ||||
| CVE-2025-38255 | 2025-07-10 | 5.5 Medium | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: lib/group_cpus: fix NULL pointer dereference from group_cpus_evenly() While testing null_blk with configfs, echo 0 > poll_queues will trigger following panic: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 27 UID: 0 PID: 920 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.15.0-02023-gadbdb95c8696-dirty #1238 PREEMPT(undef) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__bitmap_or+0x48/0x70 Call Trace: <TASK> __group_cpus_evenly+0x822/0x8c0 group_cpus_evenly+0x2d9/0x490 blk_mq_map_queues+0x1e/0x110 null_map_queues+0xc9/0x170 [null_blk] blk_mq_update_queue_map+0xdb/0x160 blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x22b/0x560 nullb_update_nr_hw_queues+0x71/0xf0 [null_blk] nullb_device_poll_queues_store+0xa4/0x130 [null_blk] configfs_write_iter+0x109/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x26e/0x6f0 ksys_write+0x79/0x180 __x64_sys_write+0x1d/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x45c4/0x45f0 do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Root cause is that numgrps is set to 0, and ZERO_SIZE_PTR is returned from kcalloc(), and later ZERO_SIZE_PTR will be deferenced. Fix the problem by checking numgrps first in group_cpus_evenly(), and return NULL directly if numgrps is zero. [[email protected]: also fix the non-SMP version] | ||||
| CVE-2025-38260 | 2025-07-10 | 5.5 Medium | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: handle csum tree error with rescue=ibadroots correctly [BUG] There is syzbot based reproducer that can crash the kernel, with the following call trace: (With some debug output added) DEBUG: rescue=ibadroots parsed BTRFS: device fsid 14d642db-7b15-43e4-81e6-4b8fac6a25f8 devid 1 transid 8 /dev/loop0 (7:0) scanned by repro (1010) BTRFS info (device loop0): first mount of filesystem 14d642db-7b15-43e4-81e6-4b8fac6a25f8 BTRFS info (device loop0): using blake2b (blake2b-256-generic) checksum algorithm BTRFS info (device loop0): using free-space-tree BTRFS warning (device loop0): checksum verify failed on logical 5312512 mirror 1 wanted 0xb043382657aede36608fd3386d6b001692ff406164733d94e2d9a180412c6003 found 0x810ceb2bacb7f0f9eb2bf3b2b15c02af867cb35ad450898169f3b1f0bd818651 level 0 DEBUG: read tree root path failed for tree csum, ret=-5 BTRFS warning (device loop0): checksum verify failed on logical 5328896 mirror 1 wanted 0x51be4e8b303da58e6340226815b70e3a93592dac3f30dd510c7517454de8567a found 0x51be4e8b303da58e634022a315b70e3a93592dac3f30dd510c7517454de8567a level 0 BTRFS warning (device loop0): checksum verify failed on logical 5292032 mirror 1 wanted 0x1924ccd683be9efc2fa98582ef58760e3848e9043db8649ee382681e220cdee4 found 0x0cb6184f6e8799d9f8cb335dccd1d1832da1071d12290dab3b85b587ecacca6e level 0 process 'repro' launched './file2' with NULL argv: empty string added DEBUG: no csum root, idatacsums=0 ibadroots=134217728 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000041: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000208-0x000000000000020f] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1010 Comm: repro Tainted: G OE 6.15.0-custom+ #249 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022 RIP: 0010:btrfs_lookup_csum+0x93/0x3d0 [btrfs] Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_lookup_bio_sums+0x47a/0xdf0 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_bbio+0x43e/0x1a80 [btrfs] submit_one_bio+0xde/0x160 [btrfs] btrfs_readahead+0x498/0x6a0 [btrfs] read_pages+0x1c3/0xb20 page_cache_ra_order+0x4b5/0xc20 filemap_get_pages+0x2d3/0x19e0 filemap_read+0x314/0xde0 __kernel_read+0x35b/0x900 bprm_execve+0x62e/0x1140 do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x3fc/0x520 __x64_sys_execveat+0xdc/0x130 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [CAUSE] Firstly the fs has a corrupted csum tree root, thus to mount the fs we have to go "ro,rescue=ibadroots" mount option. Normally with that mount option, a bad csum tree root should set BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DATA_CSUMS flag, so that any future data read will ignore csum search. But in this particular case, we have the following call trace that caused NULL csum root, but not setting BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DATA_CSUMS: load_global_roots_objectid(): ret = btrfs_search_slot(); /* Succeeded */ btrfs_item_key_to_cpu() found = true; /* We found the root item for csum tree. */ root = read_tree_root_path(); if (IS_ERR(root)) { if (!btrfs_test_opt(fs_info, IGNOREBADROOTS)) /* * Since we have rescue=ibadroots mount option, * @ret is still 0. */ break; if (!found || ret) { /* @found is true, @ret is 0, error handling for csum * tree is skipped. */ } This means we completely skipped to set BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DATA_CSUMS if the csum tree is corrupted, which results unexpected later csum lookup. [FIX] If read_tree_root_path() failed, always populate @ret to the error number. As at the end of the function, we need @ret to determine if we need to do the extra error handling for csum tree. | ||||
| CVE-2025-38284 | 2025-07-10 | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw89: pci: configure manual DAC mode via PCI config API only To support 36-bit DMA, configure chip proprietary bit via PCI config API or chip DBI interface. However, the PCI device mmap isn't set yet and the DBI is also inaccessible via mmap, so only if the bit can be accessible via PCI config API, chip can support 36-bit DMA. Otherwise, fallback to 32-bit DMA. With NULL mmap address, kernel throws trace: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001090 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 71 Comm: irq/26-pciehp Tainted: G OE 6.14.2-061402-generic #202504101348 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE RIP: 0010:rtw89_pci_ops_write16+0x12/0x30 [rtw89_pci] RSP: 0018:ffffb0ffc0acf9d8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffffffffc158f9c0 RBX: ffff94865e702020 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000718 RSI: 0000000000001090 RDI: ffff94865e702020 RBP: ffffb0ffc0acf9d8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000015 R13: 0000000000000719 R14: ffffb0ffc0acfa1f R15: ffffffffc1813060 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9486f3480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000001090 CR3: 0000000090440001 CR4: 00000000000626f0 Call Trace: <TASK> rtw89_pci_read_config_byte+0x6d/0x120 [rtw89_pci] rtw89_pci_cfg_dac+0x5b/0xb0 [rtw89_pci] rtw89_pci_probe+0xa96/0xbd0 [rtw89_pci] ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 local_pci_probe+0x47/0xa0 pci_call_probe+0x5d/0x190 pci_device_probe+0xa7/0x160 really_probe+0xf9/0x370 ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x55/0xa0 __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x140 driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 __device_attach_driver+0xcd/0x170 bus_for_each_drv+0x99/0x100 __device_attach+0xb4/0x1d0 device_attach+0x10/0x20 pci_bus_add_device+0x59/0x90 pci_bus_add_devices+0x31/0x80 pciehp_configure_device+0xaa/0x170 pciehp_enable_slot+0xd6/0x240 pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change+0xf1/0x180 pciehp_ist+0x162/0x1c0 irq_thread_fn+0x24/0x70 irq_thread+0xef/0x1c0 ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xfc/0x230 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> | ||||
| CVE-2025-38285 | 2025-07-10 | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix WARN() in get_bpf_raw_tp_regs syzkaller reported an issue: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 5971 at kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1861 get_bpf_raw_tp_regs+0xa4/0x100 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1861 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 5971 Comm: syz-executor205 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5-syzkaller-00038-g707df3375124 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:get_bpf_raw_tp_regs+0xa4/0x100 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1861 RSP: 0018:ffffc90003636fa8 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: ffffffff81c6bc4c RDX: ffff888032efc880 RSI: ffffffff81c6bc83 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffff88806a730860 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000003 R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffc90003637008 R15: 0000000000000900 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880d6cdf000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f7baee09130 CR3: 0000000029f5a000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ____bpf_get_stack_raw_tp kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1934 [inline] bpf_get_stack_raw_tp+0x24/0x160 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1931 bpf_prog_ec3b2eefa702d8d3+0x43/0x47 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1316 [inline] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:718 [inline] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:725 [inline] __bpf_trace_run kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2363 [inline] bpf_trace_run3+0x23f/0x5a0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2405 __bpf_trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned+0xfc/0x140 include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47 __traceiter_mmap_lock_acquire_returned+0x79/0xc0 include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47 __do_trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47 [inline] trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47 [inline] __mmap_lock_do_trace_acquire_returned+0x138/0x1f0 mm/mmap_lock.c:35 __mmap_lock_trace_acquire_returned include/linux/mmap_lock.h:36 [inline] mmap_read_trylock include/linux/mmap_lock.h:204 [inline] stack_map_get_build_id_offset+0x535/0x6f0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:157 __bpf_get_stack+0x307/0xa10 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:483 ____bpf_get_stack kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:499 [inline] bpf_get_stack+0x32/0x40 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:496 ____bpf_get_stack_raw_tp kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1941 [inline] bpf_get_stack_raw_tp+0x124/0x160 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1931 bpf_prog_ec3b2eefa702d8d3+0x43/0x47 Tracepoint like trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned may cause nested call as the corner case show above, which will be resolved with more general method in the future. As a result, WARN_ON_ONCE will be triggered. As Alexei suggested, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE first. | ||||
| CVE-2025-38290 | 2025-07-10 | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: fix node corruption in ar->arvifs list In current WLAN recovery code flow, ath12k_core_halt() only reinitializes the "arvifs" list head. This will cause the list node immediately following the list head to become an invalid list node. Because the prev of that node still points to the list head "arvifs", but the next of the list head "arvifs" no longer points to that list node. When a WLAN recovery occurs during the execution of a vif removal, and it happens before the spin_lock_bh(&ar->data_lock) in ath12k_mac_vdev_delete(), list_del() will detect the previously mentioned situation, thereby triggering a kernel panic. The fix is to remove and reinitialize all vif list nodes from the list head "arvifs" during WLAN halt. The reinitialization is to make the list nodes valid, ensuring that the list_del() in ath12k_mac_vdev_delete() can execute normally. Call trace: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xd4/0x100 (P) ath12k_mac_remove_link_interface.isra.0+0xf8/0x2e4 [ath12k] ath12k_scan_vdev_clean_work+0x40/0x164 [ath12k] cfg80211_wiphy_work+0xfc/0x100 process_one_work+0x164/0x2d0 worker_thread+0x254/0x380 kthread+0xfc/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 The change is mostly copied from the ath11k patch: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 | ||||
| CVE-2025-38291 | 2025-07-10 | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: Prevent sending WMI commands to firmware during firmware crash Currently, we encounter the following kernel call trace when a firmware crash occurs. This happens because the host sends WMI commands to the firmware while it is in recovery, causing the commands to fail and resulting in the kernel call trace. Set the ATH12K_FLAG_CRASH_FLUSH and ATH12K_FLAG_RECOVERY flags when the host driver receives the firmware crash notification from MHI. This prevents sending WMI commands to the firmware during recovery. Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x75/0xc0 register_lock_class+0x6be/0x7a0 ? __lock_acquire+0x644/0x19a0 __lock_acquire+0x95/0x19a0 lock_acquire+0x265/0x310 ? ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k] ? find_held_lock+0x34/0xa0 ? ath12k_ce_send+0x56/0x210 [ath12k] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x33/0x70 ? ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k] ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k] ath12k_htc_send+0x178/0x390 [ath12k] ath12k_wmi_cmd_send_nowait+0x76/0xa0 [ath12k] ath12k_wmi_cmd_send+0x62/0x190 [ath12k] ath12k_wmi_pdev_bss_chan_info_request+0x62/0xc0 [ath1 ath12k_mac_op_get_survey+0x2be/0x310 [ath12k] ieee80211_dump_survey+0x99/0x240 [mac80211] nl80211_dump_survey+0xe7/0x470 [cfg80211] ? kmalloc_reserve+0x59/0xf0 genl_dumpit+0x24/0x70 netlink_dump+0x177/0x360 __netlink_dump_start+0x206/0x280 genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit.isra.22+0x8a/0xe0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.isra.23+0xe0/0xe0 ? genl_op_lock.part.12+0x10/0x10 ? genl_dumpit+0x70/0x70 genl_rcv_msg+0x1d0/0x290 ? nl80211_del_station+0x330/0x330 [cfg80211] ? genl_get_cmd_both+0x50/0x50 netlink_rcv_skb+0x4f/0x100 genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30 netlink_unicast+0x1b6/0x260 netlink_sendmsg+0x31a/0x450 __sock_sendmsg+0xa8/0xb0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x1e4/0x260 ___sys_sendmsg+0x89/0xe0 ? local_clock_noinstr+0xb/0xc0 ? rcu_is_watching+0xd/0x40 ? kfree+0x1de/0x370 ? __sys_sendmsg+0x7a/0xc0 Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 | ||||