Total
653 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-55642 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: Prevent potential deadlocks in zone write plug error recovery Zone write plugging for handling writes to zones of a zoned block device always execute a zone report whenever a write BIO to a zone fails. The intent of this is to ensure that the tracking of a zone write pointer is always correct to ensure that the alignment to a zone write pointer of write BIOs can be checked on submission and that we can always correctly emulate zone append operations using regular write BIOs. However, this error recovery scheme introduces a potential deadlock if a device queue freeze is initiated while BIOs are still plugged in a zone write plug and one of these write operation fails. In such case, the disk zone write plug error recovery work is scheduled and executes a report zone. This in turn can result in a request allocation in the underlying driver to issue the report zones command to the device. But with the device queue freeze already started, this allocation will block, preventing the report zone execution and the continuation of the processing of the plugged BIOs. As plugged BIOs hold a queue usage reference, the queue freeze itself will never complete, resulting in a deadlock. Avoid this problem by completely removing from the zone write plugging code the use of report zones operations after a failed write operation, instead relying on the device user to either execute a report zones, reset the zone, finish the zone, or give up writing to the device (which is a fairly common pattern for file systems which degrade to read-only after write failures). This is not an unreasonnable requirement as all well-behaved applications, FSes and device mapper already use report zones to recover from write errors whenever possible by comparing the current position of a zone write pointer with what their assumption about the position is. The changes to remove the automatic error recovery are as follows: - Completely remove the error recovery work and its associated resources (zone write plug list head, disk error list, and disk zone_wplugs_work work struct). This also removes the functions disk_zone_wplug_set_error() and disk_zone_wplug_clear_error(). - Change the BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_ERROR zone write plug flag into BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_NEED_WP_UPDATE. This new flag is set for a zone write plug whenever a write opration targetting the zone of the zone write plug fails. This flag indicates that the zone write pointer offset is not reliable and that it must be updated when the next report zone, reset zone, finish zone or disk revalidation is executed. - Modify blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio() to set the BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_NEED_WP_UPDATE flag for the target zone of a failed write BIO. - Modify the function disk_zone_wplug_set_wp_offset() to clear this new flag, thus implementing recovery of a correct write pointer offset with the reset (all) zone and finish zone operations. - Modify blkdev_report_zones() to always use the disk_report_zones_cb() callback so that disk_zone_wplug_sync_wp_offset() can be called for any zone marked with the BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_NEED_WP_UPDATE flag. This implements recovery of a correct write pointer offset for zone write plugs marked with BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_NEED_WP_UPDATE and within the range of the report zones operation executed by the user. - Modify blk_revalidate_seq_zone() to call disk_zone_wplug_sync_wp_offset() for all sequential write required zones when a zoned block device is revalidated, thus always resolving any inconsistency between the write pointer offset of zone write plugs and the actual write pointer position of sequential zones. | ||||
| CVE-2024-54683 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: IDLETIMER: Fix for possible ABBA deadlock Deletion of the last rule referencing a given idletimer may happen at the same time as a read of its file in sysfs: | ====================================================== | WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected | 6.12.0-rc7-01692-g5e9a28f41134-dirty #594 Not tainted | ------------------------------------------------------ | iptables/3303 is trying to acquire lock: | ffff8881057e04b8 (kn->active#48){++++}-{0:0}, at: __kernfs_remove+0x20 | | but task is already holding lock: | ffffffffa0249068 (list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: idletimer_tg_destroy_v] | | which lock already depends on the new lock. A simple reproducer is: | #!/bin/bash | | while true; do | iptables -A INPUT -i foo -j IDLETIMER --timeout 10 --label "testme" | iptables -D INPUT -i foo -j IDLETIMER --timeout 10 --label "testme" | done & | while true; do | cat /sys/class/xt_idletimer/timers/testme >/dev/null | done Avoid this by freeing list_mutex right after deleting the element from the list, then continuing with the teardown. | ||||
| CVE-2024-54460 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: iso: Fix circular lock in iso_listen_bis This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by releasing the socket lock before enterning iso_listen_bis, to avoid any potential deadlock with hdev lock. [ 75.307983] ====================================================== [ 75.307984] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 75.307985] 6.12.0-rc6+ #22 Not tainted [ 75.307987] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 75.307987] kworker/u81:2/2623 is trying to acquire lock: [ 75.307988] ffff8fde1769da58 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO) at: iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth] [ 75.308021] but task is already holding lock: [ 75.308022] ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock) at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308053] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 75.308054] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 75.308055] -> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 75.308057] __mutex_lock+0xad/0xc50 [ 75.308061] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 75.308063] iso_sock_listen+0x143/0x5c0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308085] __sys_listen_socket+0x49/0x60 [ 75.308088] __x64_sys_listen+0x4c/0x90 [ 75.308090] x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0 [ 75.308092] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 75.308095] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 75.308098] -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 75.308100] __lock_acquire+0x155e/0x25f0 [ 75.308103] lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300 [ 75.308105] lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x90 [ 75.308107] iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth] [ 75.308128] hci_connect_cfm+0x6c/0x190 [bluetooth] [ 75.308155] hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x27b/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308180] hci_le_meta_evt+0xe7/0x200 [bluetooth] [ 75.308206] hci_event_packet+0x21f/0x5c0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308230] hci_rx_work+0x3ae/0xb10 [bluetooth] [ 75.308254] process_one_work+0x212/0x740 [ 75.308256] worker_thread+0x1bd/0x3a0 [ 75.308258] kthread+0xe4/0x120 [ 75.308259] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 75.308261] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 75.308263] other info that might help us debug this: [ 75.308264] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 75.308264] CPU0 CPU1 [ 75.308265] ---- ---- [ 75.308265] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 75.308267] lock(sk_lock- AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 75.308268] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 75.308269] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 75.308270] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 75.308271] 4 locks held by kworker/u81:2/2623: [ 75.308272] #0: ffff8fdd66e52148 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x443/0x740 [ 75.308276] #1: ffffafb488b7fe48 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)), at: process_one_work+0x1ce/0x740 [ 75.308280] #2: ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3} at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308304] #3: ffffffffb6ba4900 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_connect_cfm+0x29/0x190 [bluetooth] | ||||
| CVE-2024-54191 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: iso: Fix circular lock in iso_conn_big_sync This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by reworking iso_sock_recvmsg, to ensure that the socket lock is always released before calling a function that locks hdev. [ 561.670344] ====================================================== [ 561.670346] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 561.670349] 6.12.0-rc6+ #26 Not tainted [ 561.670351] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 561.670353] iso-tester/3289 is trying to acquire lock: [ 561.670355] ffff88811f600078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth] [ 561.670405] but task is already holding lock: [ 561.670407] ffff88815af58258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: iso_sock_recvmsg+0xbf/0x500 [bluetooth] [ 561.670450] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 561.670452] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 561.670453] -> #2 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 561.670458] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670463] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [ 561.670467] bt_accept_dequeue+0x1a5/0x4d0 [bluetooth] [ 561.670510] iso_sock_accept+0x271/0x830 [bluetooth] [ 561.670547] do_accept+0x3dd/0x610 [ 561.670550] __sys_accept4+0xd8/0x170 [ 561.670553] __x64_sys_accept+0x74/0xc0 [ 561.670556] x64_sys_call+0x17d6/0x25f0 [ 561.670559] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670563] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670567] -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 561.670571] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670574] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [ 561.670577] iso_sock_listen+0x2de/0xf30 [bluetooth] [ 561.670617] __sys_listen_socket+0xef/0x130 [ 561.670620] __x64_sys_listen+0xe1/0x190 [ 561.670623] x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0 [ 561.670626] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670629] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670632] -> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 561.670636] __lock_acquire+0x32ad/0x6ab0 [ 561.670639] lock_acquire.part.0+0x118/0x360 [ 561.670642] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670644] __mutex_lock+0x18d/0x12f0 [ 561.670647] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 561.670651] iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth] [ 561.670687] iso_sock_recvmsg+0x3e9/0x500 [bluetooth] [ 561.670722] sock_recvmsg+0x1d5/0x240 [ 561.670725] sock_read_iter+0x27d/0x470 [ 561.670727] vfs_read+0x9a0/0xd30 [ 561.670731] ksys_read+0x1a8/0x250 [ 561.670733] __x64_sys_read+0x72/0xc0 [ 561.670736] x64_sys_call+0x1b12/0x25f0 [ 561.670738] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670741] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670744] other info that might help us debug this: [ 561.670745] Chain exists of: &hdev->lock --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH [ 561.670751] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 561.670753] CPU0 CPU1 [ 561.670754] ---- ---- [ 561.670756] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH); [ 561.670758] lock(sk_lock AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 561.670761] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH); [ 561.670764] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 561.670767] *** DEADLOCK *** | ||||
| CVE-2024-48875 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: don't take dev_replace rwsem on task already holding it Running fstests btrfs/011 with MKFS_OPTIONS="-O rst" to force the usage of the RAID stripe-tree, we get the following splat from lockdep: BTRFS info (device sdd): dev_replace from /dev/sdd (devid 1) to /dev/sdb started ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.11.0-rc3-btrfs-for-next #599 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- btrfs/2326 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810f215c98 (&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_map_block+0x39f/0x2250 but task is already holding lock: ffff88810f215c98 (&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_map_block+0x39f/0x2250 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem); lock(&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 1 lock held by btrfs/2326: #0: ffff88810f215c98 (&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_map_block+0x39f/0x2250 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2326 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-btrfs-for-next #599 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x80 __lock_acquire+0x2798/0x69d0 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 lock_acquire+0x19d/0x4a0 ? btrfs_map_block+0x39f/0x2250 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110 ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 down_read+0x8e/0x440 ? btrfs_map_block+0x39f/0x2250 ? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10 ? do_raw_read_unlock+0x44/0x70 ? _raw_read_unlock+0x23/0x40 btrfs_map_block+0x39f/0x2250 ? btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl+0xd69/0x1d00 ? btrfs_bio_counter_inc_blocked+0xd9/0x2e0 ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6e/0x70 ? __pfx_btrfs_map_block+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_btrfs_bio_counter_inc_blocked+0x10/0x10 ? kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x1f2/0x300 ? mempool_alloc_noprof+0xed/0x2b0 btrfs_submit_chunk+0x28d/0x17e0 ? __pfx_btrfs_submit_chunk+0x10/0x10 ? bvec_alloc+0xd7/0x1b0 ? bio_add_folio+0x171/0x270 ? __pfx_bio_add_folio+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_read+0x20/0x20 btrfs_submit_bio+0x37/0x80 read_extent_buffer_pages+0x3df/0x6c0 btrfs_read_extent_buffer+0x13e/0x5f0 read_tree_block+0x81/0xe0 read_block_for_search+0x4bd/0x7a0 ? __pfx_read_block_for_search+0x10/0x10 btrfs_search_slot+0x78d/0x2720 ? __pfx_btrfs_search_slot+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6e/0x70 ? kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x1f2/0x300 btrfs_get_raid_extent_offset+0x181/0x820 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_btrfs_get_raid_extent_offset+0x10/0x10 ? down_read+0x194/0x440 ? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10 ? do_raw_read_unlock+0x44/0x70 ? _raw_read_unlock+0x23/0x40 btrfs_map_block+0x5b5/0x2250 ? __pfx_btrfs_map_block+0x10/0x10 scrub_submit_initial_read+0x8fe/0x11b0 ? __pfx_scrub_submit_initial_read+0x10/0x10 submit_initial_group_read+0x161/0x3a0 ? lock_release+0x20e/0x710 ? __pfx_submit_initial_group_read+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 scrub_simple_mirror.isra.0+0x3eb/0x580 scrub_stripe+0xe4d/0x1440 ? lock_release+0x20e/0x710 ? __pfx_scrub_stripe+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? do_raw_read_unlock+0x44/0x70 ? _raw_read_unlock+0x23/0x40 scrub_chunk+0x257/0x4a0 scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x64c/0xf70 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x147/0x5f0 ? __pfx_scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x10/0x10 ? bit_wait_timeout+0xb0/0x170 ? __up_read+0x189/0x700 ? scrub_workers_get+0x231/0x300 ? up_write+0x490/0x4f0 btrfs_scrub_dev+0x52e/0xcd0 ? create_pending_snapshots+0x230/0x250 ? __pfx_btrfs_scrub_dev+0x10/0x10 btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl+0xd69/0x1d00 ? lock_acquire+0x19d/0x4a0 ? __pfx_btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl+0x10/0x10 ? ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2024-47141 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pinmux: Use sequential access to access desc->pinmux data When two client of the same gpio call pinctrl_select_state() for the same functionality, we are seeing NULL pointer issue while accessing desc->mux_owner. Let's say two processes A, B executing in pin_request() for the same pin and process A updates the desc->mux_usecount but not yet updated the desc->mux_owner while process B see the desc->mux_usecount which got updated by A path and further executes strcmp and while accessing desc->mux_owner it crashes with NULL pointer. Serialize the access to mux related setting with a mutex lock. cpu0 (process A) cpu1(process B) pinctrl_select_state() { pinctrl_select_state() { pin_request() { pin_request() { ... .... } else { desc->mux_usecount++; desc->mux_usecount && strcmp(desc->mux_owner, owner)) { if (desc->mux_usecount > 1) return 0; desc->mux_owner = owner; } } | ||||
| CVE-2023-53013 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ptdma: pt_core_execute_cmd() should use spinlock The interrupt handler (pt_core_irq_handler()) of the ptdma driver can be called from interrupt context. The code flow in this function can lead down to pt_core_execute_cmd() which will attempt to grab a mutex, which is not appropriate in interrupt context and ultimately leads to a kernel panic. The fix here changes this mutex to a spinlock, which has been verified to resolve the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2023-52932 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/swapfile: add cond_resched() in get_swap_pages() The softlockup still occurs in get_swap_pages() under memory pressure. 64 CPU cores, 64GB memory, and 28 zram devices, the disksize of each zram device is 50MB with same priority as si. Use the stress-ng tool to increase memory pressure, causing the system to oom frequently. The plist_for_each_entry_safe() loops in get_swap_pages() could reach tens of thousands of times to find available space (extreme case: cond_resched() is not called in scan_swap_map_slots()). Let's add cond_resched() into get_swap_pages() when failed to find available space to avoid softlockup. | ||||
| CVE-2022-49547 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix deadlock between concurrent dio writes when low on free data space When reserving data space for a direct IO write we can end up deadlocking if we have multiple tasks attempting a write to the same file range, there are multiple extents covered by that file range, we are low on available space for data and the writes don't expand the inode's i_size. The deadlock can happen like this: 1) We have a file with an i_size of 1M, at offset 0 it has an extent with a size of 128K and at offset 128K it has another extent also with a size of 128K; 2) Task A does a direct IO write against file range [0, 256K), and because the write is within the i_size boundary, it takes the inode's lock (VFS level) in shared mode; 3) Task A locks the file range [0, 256K) at btrfs_dio_iomap_begin(), and then gets the extent map for the extent covering the range [0, 128K). At btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write(), it creates an ordered extent for that file range ([0, 128K)); 4) Before returning from btrfs_dio_iomap_begin(), it unlocks the file range [0, 256K); 5) Task A executes btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() again, this time for the file range [128K, 256K), and locks the file range [128K, 256K); 6) Task B starts a direct IO write against file range [0, 256K) as well. It also locks the inode in shared mode, as it's within the i_size limit, and then tries to lock file range [0, 256K). It is able to lock the subrange [0, 128K) but then blocks waiting for the range [128K, 256K), as it is currently locked by task A; 7) Task A enters btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write() and tries to reserve data space. Because we are low on available free space, it triggers the async data reclaim task, and waits for it to reserve data space; 8) The async reclaim task decides to wait for all existing ordered extents to complete (through btrfs_wait_ordered_roots()). It finds the ordered extent previously created by task A for the file range [0, 128K) and waits for it to complete; 9) The ordered extent for the file range [0, 128K) can not complete because it blocks at btrfs_finish_ordered_io() when trying to lock the file range [0, 128K). This results in a deadlock, because: - task B is holding the file range [0, 128K) locked, waiting for the range [128K, 256K) to be unlocked by task A; - task A is holding the file range [128K, 256K) locked and it's waiting for the async data reclaim task to satisfy its space reservation request; - the async data reclaim task is waiting for ordered extent [0, 128K) to complete, but the ordered extent can not complete because the file range [0, 128K) is currently locked by task B, which is waiting on task A to unlock file range [128K, 256K) and task A waiting on the async data reclaim task. This results in a deadlock between 4 task: task A, task B, the async data reclaim task and the task doing ordered extent completion (a work queue task). This type of deadlock can sporadically be triggered by the test case generic/300 from fstests, and results in a stack trace like the following: [12084.033689] INFO: task kworker/u16:7:123749 blocked for more than 241 seconds. [12084.034877] Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-btrfs-next-115 #1 [12084.035562] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [12084.036548] task:kworker/u16:7 state:D stack: 0 pid:123749 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [12084.036554] Workqueue: btrfs-flush_delalloc btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] [12084.036599] Call Trace: [12084.036601] <TASK> [12084.036606] __schedule+0x3cb/0xed0 [12084.036616] schedule+0x4e/0xb0 [12084.036620] btrfs_start_ordered_extent+0x109/0x1c0 [btrfs] [12084.036651] ? prepare_to_wait_exclusive+0xc0/0xc0 [12084.036659] btrfs_run_ordered_extent_work+0x1a/0x30 [btrfs] [12084.036688] btrfs_work_helper+0xf8/0x400 [btrfs] [12084.0367 ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2022-49496 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: mediatek: vcodec: prevent kernel crash when rmmod mtk-vcodec-dec.ko If the driver support subdev mode, the parameter "dev->pm.dev" will be NULL in mtk_vcodec_dec_remove. Kernel will crash when try to rmmod mtk-vcodec-dec.ko. [ 4380.702726] pc : do_raw_spin_trylock+0x4/0x80 [ 4380.707075] lr : _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x90/0x14c [ 4380.711509] sp : ffff80000819bc10 [ 4380.714811] x29: ffff80000819bc10 x28: ffff3600c03e4000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 4380.721934] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 4380.729057] x23: ffff3600c0f34930 x22: ffffd5e923549000 x21: 0000000000000220 [ 4380.736179] x20: 0000000000000208 x19: ffffd5e9213e8ebc x18: 0000000000000020 [ 4380.743298] x17: 0000002000000000 x16: ffffd5e9213e8e90 x15: 696c346f65646976 [ 4380.750420] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000001 x12: 0000000000000040 [ 4380.757542] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 [ 4380.764664] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : ffff3600c7273ae8 x6 : ffffd5e9213e8ebc [ 4380.771786] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 4380.778908] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff3600c03e4000 x0 : 0000000000000208 [ 4380.786031] Call trace: [ 4380.788465] do_raw_spin_trylock+0x4/0x80 [ 4380.792462] __pm_runtime_disable+0x2c/0x1b0 [ 4380.796723] mtk_vcodec_dec_remove+0x5c/0xa0 [mtk_vcodec_dec] [ 4380.802466] platform_remove+0x2c/0x60 [ 4380.806204] __device_release_driver+0x194/0x250 [ 4380.810810] driver_detach+0xc8/0x15c [ 4380.814462] bus_remove_driver+0x5c/0xb0 [ 4380.818375] driver_unregister+0x34/0x64 [ 4380.822288] platform_driver_unregister+0x18/0x24 [ 4380.826979] mtk_vcodec_dec_driver_exit+0x1c/0x888 [mtk_vcodec_dec] [ 4380.833240] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x190/0x224 [ 4380.838020] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 [ 4380.841760] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x60/0x11c [ 4380.846540] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x90 [ 4380.849844] el0_svc+0x4c/0x100 [ 4380.852975] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xec/0xf0 [ 4380.857148] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 [ 4380.860801] Code: 94431515 17ffffca d503201f d503245f (b9400004) | ||||
| CVE-2022-49446 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvdimm: Fix firmware activation deadlock scenarios Lockdep reports the following deadlock scenarios for CXL root device power-management, device_prepare(), operations, and device_shutdown() operations for 'nd_region' devices: Chain exists of: &nvdimm_region_key --> &nvdimm_bus->reconfig_mutex --> system_transition_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(system_transition_mutex); lock(&nvdimm_bus->reconfig_mutex); lock(system_transition_mutex); lock(&nvdimm_region_key); Chain exists of: &cxl_nvdimm_bridge_key --> acpi_scan_lock --> &cxl_root_key Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&cxl_root_key); lock(acpi_scan_lock); lock(&cxl_root_key); lock(&cxl_nvdimm_bridge_key); These stem from holding nvdimm_bus_lock() over hibernate_quiet_exec() which walks the entire system device topology taking device_lock() along the way. The nvdimm_bus_lock() is protecting against unregistration, multiple simultaneous ops callers, and preventing activate_show() from racing activate_store(). For the first 2, the lock is redundant. Unregistration already flushes all ops users, and sysfs already prevents multiple threads to be active in an ops handler at the same time. For the last userspace should already be waiting for its last activate_store() to complete, and does not need activate_show() to flush the write side, so this lock usage can be deleted in these attributes. | ||||
| CVE-2022-49441 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tty: fix deadlock caused by calling printk() under tty_port->lock pty_write() invokes kmalloc() which may invoke a normal printk() to print failure message. This can cause a deadlock in the scenario reported by syz-bot below: CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 ---- ---- ---- lock(console_owner); lock(&port_lock_key); lock(&port->lock); lock(&port_lock_key); lock(&port->lock); lock(console_owner); As commit dbdda842fe96 ("printk: Add console owner and waiter logic to load balance console writes") said, such deadlock can be prevented by using printk_deferred() in kmalloc() (which is invoked in the section guarded by the port->lock). But there are too many printk() on the kmalloc() path, and kmalloc() can be called from anywhere, so changing printk() to printk_deferred() is too complicated and inelegant. Therefore, this patch chooses to specify __GFP_NOWARN to kmalloc(), so that printk() will not be called, and this deadlock problem can be avoided. Syzbot reported the following lockdep error: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.4.143-00237-g08ccc19a-dirty #10 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.4/29420 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8aedb2a0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}, at: console_trylock_spinning kernel/printk/printk.c:1752 [inline] ffffffff8aedb2a0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}, at: vprintk_emit+0x2ca/0x470 kernel/printk/printk.c:2023 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880119c9158 (&port->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: pty_write+0xf4/0x1f0 drivers/tty/pty.c:120 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&port->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 tty_port_tty_get drivers/tty/tty_port.c:288 [inline] <-- lock(&port->lock); tty_port_default_wakeup+0x1d/0xb0 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:47 serial8250_tx_chars+0x530/0xa80 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1767 serial8250_handle_irq.part.0+0x31f/0x3d0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1854 serial8250_handle_irq drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1827 [inline] <-- lock(&port_lock_key); serial8250_default_handle_irq+0xb2/0x220 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1870 serial8250_interrupt+0xfd/0x200 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c:126 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x109/0xa50 kernel/irq/handle.c:156 [...] -> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}-{2:2}: __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 serial8250_console_write+0x184/0xa40 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3198 <-- lock(&port_lock_key); call_console_drivers kernel/printk/printk.c:1819 [inline] console_unlock+0x8cb/0xd00 kernel/printk/printk.c:2504 vprintk_emit+0x1b5/0x470 kernel/printk/printk.c:2024 <-- lock(console_owner); vprintk_func+0x8d/0x250 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:394 printk+0xba/0xed kernel/printk/printk.c:2084 register_console+0x8b3/0xc10 kernel/printk/printk.c:2829 univ8250_console_init+0x3a/0x46 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c:681 console_init+0x49d/0x6d3 kernel/printk/printk.c:2915 start_kernel+0x5e9/0x879 init/main.c:713 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:241 -> #0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}: [...] lock_acquire+0x127/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4734 console_trylock_spinning kernel/printk/printk.c:1773 ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2022-49406 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: Fix potential deadlock in blk_ia_range_sysfs_show() When being read, a sysfs attribute is already protected against removal with the kobject node active reference counter. As a result, in blk_ia_range_sysfs_show(), there is no need to take the queue sysfs lock when reading the value of a range attribute. Using the queue sysfs lock in this function creates a potential deadlock situation with the disk removal, something that a lockdep signals with a splat when the device is removed: [ 760.703551] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 760.703551] [ 760.703554] CPU0 CPU1 [ 760.703556] ---- ---- [ 760.703558] lock(&q->sysfs_lock); [ 760.703565] lock(kn->active#385); [ 760.703573] lock(&q->sysfs_lock); [ 760.703579] lock(kn->active#385); [ 760.703587] [ 760.703587] *** DEADLOCK *** Solve this by removing the mutex_lock()/mutex_unlock() calls from blk_ia_range_sysfs_show(). | ||||
| CVE-2022-49371 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: driver core: fix deadlock in __device_attach In __device_attach function, The lock holding logic is as follows: ... __device_attach device_lock(dev) // get lock dev async_schedule_dev(__device_attach_async_helper, dev); // func async_schedule_node async_schedule_node_domain(func) entry = kzalloc(sizeof(struct async_entry), GFP_ATOMIC); /* when fail or work limit, sync to execute func, but __device_attach_async_helper will get lock dev as well, which will lead to A-A deadlock. */ if (!entry || atomic_read(&entry_count) > MAX_WORK) { func; else queue_work_node(node, system_unbound_wq, &entry->work) device_unlock(dev) As shown above, when it is allowed to do async probes, because of out of memory or work limit, async work is not allowed, to do sync execute instead. it will lead to A-A deadlock because of __device_attach_async_helper getting lock dev. To fix the deadlock, move the async_schedule_dev outside device_lock, as we can see, in async_schedule_node_domain, the parameter of queue_work_node is system_unbound_wq, so it can accept concurrent operations. which will also not change the code logic, and will not lead to deadlock. | ||||
| CVE-2022-49327 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bcache: avoid journal no-space deadlock by reserving 1 journal bucket The journal no-space deadlock was reported time to time. Such deadlock can happen in the following situation. When all journal buckets are fully filled by active jset with heavy write I/O load, the cache set registration (after a reboot) will load all active jsets and inserting them into the btree again (which is called journal replay). If a journaled bkey is inserted into a btree node and results btree node split, new journal request might be triggered. For example, the btree grows one more level after the node split, then the root node record in cache device super block will be upgrade by bch_journal_meta() from bch_btree_set_root(). But there is no space in journal buckets, the journal replay has to wait for new journal bucket to be reclaimed after at least one journal bucket replayed. This is one example that how the journal no-space deadlock happens. The solution to avoid the deadlock is to reserve 1 journal bucket in run time, and only permit the reserved journal bucket to be used during cache set registration procedure for things like journal replay. Then the journal space will never be fully filled, there is no chance for journal no-space deadlock to happen anymore. This patch adds a new member "bool do_reserve" in struct journal, it is inititalized to 0 (false) when struct journal is allocated, and set to 1 (true) by bch_journal_space_reserve() when all initialization done in run_cache_set(). In the run time when journal_reclaim() tries to allocate a new journal bucket, free_journal_buckets() is called to check whether there are enough free journal buckets to use. If there is only 1 free journal bucket and journal->do_reserve is 1 (true), the last bucket is reserved and free_journal_buckets() will return 0 to indicate no free journal bucket. Then journal_reclaim() will give up, and try next time to see whetheer there is free journal bucket to allocate. By this method, there is always 1 jouranl bucket reserved in run time. During the cache set registration, journal->do_reserve is 0 (false), so the reserved journal bucket can be used to avoid the no-space deadlock. | ||||
| CVE-2022-49316 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4: Don't hold the layoutget locks across multiple RPC calls When doing layoutget as part of the open() compound, we have to be careful to release the layout locks before we can call any further RPC calls, such as setattr(). The reason is that those calls could trigger a recall, which could deadlock. | ||||
| CVE-2022-49311 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers: staging: rtl8192bs: Fix deadlock in rtw_joinbss_event_prehandle() There is a deadlock in rtw_joinbss_event_prehandle(), which is shown below: (Thread 1) | (Thread 2) | _set_timer() rtw_joinbss_event_prehandle()| mod_timer() spin_lock_bh() //(1) | (wait a time) ... | _rtw_join_timeout_handler() del_timer_sync() | spin_lock_bh() //(2) (wait timer to stop) | ... We hold pmlmepriv->lock in position (1) of thread 1 and use del_timer_sync() to wait timer to stop, but timer handler also need pmlmepriv->lock in position (2) of thread 2. As a result, rtw_joinbss_event_prehandle() will block forever. This patch extracts del_timer_sync() from the protection of spin_lock_bh(), which could let timer handler to obtain the needed lock. What`s more, we change spin_lock_bh() to spin_lock_irq() in _rtw_join_timeout_handler() in order to prevent deadlock. | ||||
| CVE-2022-49296 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix possible deadlock when holding Fwb to get inline_data 1, mount with wsync. 2, create a file with O_RDWR, and the request was sent to mds.0: ceph_atomic_open()--> ceph_mdsc_do_request(openc) finish_open(file, dentry, ceph_open)--> ceph_open()--> ceph_init_file()--> ceph_init_file_info()--> ceph_uninline_data()--> { ... if (inline_version == 1 || /* initial version, no data */ inline_version == CEPH_INLINE_NONE) goto out_unlock; ... } The inline_version will be 1, which is the initial version for the new create file. And here the ci->i_inline_version will keep with 1, it's buggy. 3, buffer write to the file immediately: ceph_write_iter()--> ceph_get_caps(file, need=Fw, want=Fb, ...); generic_perform_write()--> a_ops->write_begin()--> ceph_write_begin()--> netfs_write_begin()--> netfs_begin_read()--> netfs_rreq_submit_slice()--> netfs_read_from_server()--> rreq->netfs_ops->issue_read()--> ceph_netfs_issue_read()--> { ... if (ci->i_inline_version != CEPH_INLINE_NONE && ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline(subreq)) return; ... } ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, Fwb); The ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline() will send a getattr(Fsr) request to mds.1. 4, then the mds.1 will request the rd lock for CInode::filelock from the auth mds.0, the mds.0 will do the CInode::filelock state transation from excl --> sync, but it need to revoke the Fxwb caps back from the clients. While the kernel client has aleady held the Fwb caps and waiting for the getattr(Fsr). It's deadlock! URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55377 | ||||
| CVE-2022-49123 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ath11k: Fix frames flush failure caused by deadlock We are seeing below warnings: kernel: [25393.301506] ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to flush mgmt transmit queue 0 kernel: [25398.421509] ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to flush mgmt transmit queue 0 kernel: [25398.421831] ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: dropping mgmt frame for vdev 0, is_started 0 this means ath11k fails to flush mgmt. frames because wmi_mgmt_tx_work has no chance to run in 5 seconds. By setting /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs to 20 and increasing ATH11K_FLUSH_TIMEOUT to 50 we get below warnings: kernel: [ 120.763160] INFO: task wpa_supplicant:924 blocked for more than 20 seconds. kernel: [ 120.763169] Not tainted 5.10.90 #12 kernel: [ 120.763177] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. kernel: [ 120.763186] task:wpa_supplicant state:D stack: 0 pid: 924 ppid: 1 flags:0x000043a0 kernel: [ 120.763201] Call Trace: kernel: [ 120.763214] __schedule+0x785/0x12fa kernel: [ 120.763224] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xe2/0x1bb kernel: [ 120.763242] schedule+0x7e/0xa1 kernel: [ 120.763253] schedule_timeout+0x98/0xfe kernel: [ 120.763266] ? run_local_timers+0x4a/0x4a kernel: [ 120.763291] ath11k_mac_flush_tx_complete+0x197/0x2b1 [ath11k 13c3a9bf37790f4ac8103b3decf7ab4008ac314a] kernel: [ 120.763306] ? init_wait_entry+0x2e/0x2e kernel: [ 120.763343] __ieee80211_flush_queues+0x167/0x21f [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c] kernel: [ 120.763378] __ieee80211_recalc_idle+0x105/0x125 [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c] kernel: [ 120.763411] ieee80211_recalc_idle+0x14/0x27 [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c] kernel: [ 120.763441] ieee80211_free_chanctx+0x77/0xa2 [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c] kernel: [ 120.763473] __ieee80211_vif_release_channel+0x100/0x131 [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c] kernel: [ 120.763540] ieee80211_vif_release_channel+0x66/0x81 [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c] kernel: [ 120.763572] ieee80211_destroy_auth_data+0xa3/0xe6 [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c] kernel: [ 120.763612] ieee80211_mgd_deauth+0x178/0x29b [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c] kernel: [ 120.763654] cfg80211_mlme_deauth+0x1a8/0x22c [cfg80211 8945aa5bc2af5f6972336665d8ad6f9c191ad5be] kernel: [ 120.763697] nl80211_deauthenticate+0xfa/0x123 [cfg80211 8945aa5bc2af5f6972336665d8ad6f9c191ad5be] kernel: [ 120.763715] genl_rcv_msg+0x392/0x3c2 kernel: [ 120.763750] ? nl80211_associate+0x432/0x432 [cfg80211 8945aa5bc2af5f6972336665d8ad6f9c191ad5be] kernel: [ 120.763782] ? nl80211_associate+0x432/0x432 [cfg80211 8945aa5bc2af5f6972336665d8ad6f9c191ad5be] kernel: [ 120.763802] ? genl_rcv+0x36/0x36 kernel: [ 120.763814] netlink_rcv_skb+0x89/0xf7 kernel: [ 120.763829] genl_rcv+0x28/0x36 kernel: [ 120.763840] netlink_unicast+0x179/0x24b kernel: [ 120.763854] netlink_sendmsg+0x393/0x401 kernel: [ 120.763872] sock_sendmsg+0x72/0x76 kernel: [ 120.763886] ____sys_sendmsg+0x170/0x1e6 kernel: [ 120.763897] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x7a/0xa2 kernel: [ 120.763914] ___sys_sendmsg+0x95/0xd1 kernel: [ 120.763940] __sys_sendmsg+0x85/0xbf kernel: [ 120.763956] do_syscall_64+0x43/0x55 kernel: [ 120.763966] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 kernel: [ 120.763977] RIP: 0033:0x79089f3fcc83 kernel: [ 120.763986] RSP: 002b:00007ffe604f0508 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e kernel: [ 120.763997] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000059b40e987690 RCX: 000079089f3fcc83 kernel: [ 120.764006] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe604f0558 RDI: 0000000000000009 kernel: [ 120.764014] RBP: 00007ffe604f0540 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000400000 kernel: [ 120.764023] R10: 00007ffe604f0638 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000059b40ea04980 kernel: [ 120.764032] R13: 00007ffe604 ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2021-47637 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-10-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ubifs: Fix deadlock in concurrent rename whiteout and inode writeback Following hung tasks: [ 77.028764] task:kworker/u8:4 state:D stack: 0 pid: 132 [ 77.028820] Call Trace: [ 77.029027] schedule+0x8c/0x1b0 [ 77.029067] mutex_lock+0x50/0x60 [ 77.029074] ubifs_write_inode+0x68/0x1f0 [ubifs] [ 77.029117] __writeback_single_inode+0x43c/0x570 [ 77.029128] writeback_sb_inodes+0x259/0x740 [ 77.029148] wb_writeback+0x107/0x4d0 [ 77.029163] wb_workfn+0x162/0x7b0 [ 92.390442] task:aa state:D stack: 0 pid: 1506 [ 92.390448] Call Trace: [ 92.390458] schedule+0x8c/0x1b0 [ 92.390461] wb_wait_for_completion+0x82/0xd0 [ 92.390469] __writeback_inodes_sb_nr+0xb2/0x110 [ 92.390472] writeback_inodes_sb_nr+0x14/0x20 [ 92.390476] ubifs_budget_space+0x705/0xdd0 [ubifs] [ 92.390503] do_rename.cold+0x7f/0x187 [ubifs] [ 92.390549] ubifs_rename+0x8b/0x180 [ubifs] [ 92.390571] vfs_rename+0xdb2/0x1170 [ 92.390580] do_renameat2+0x554/0x770 , are caused by concurrent rename whiteout and inode writeback processes: rename_whiteout(Thread 1) wb_workfn(Thread2) ubifs_rename do_rename lock_4_inodes (Hold ui_mutex) ubifs_budget_space make_free_space shrink_liability __writeback_inodes_sb_nr bdi_split_work_to_wbs (Queue new wb work) wb_do_writeback(wb work) __writeback_single_inode ubifs_write_inode LOCK(ui_mutex) ↑ wb_wait_for_completion (Wait wb work) <-- deadlock! Reproducer (Detail program in [Link]): 1. SYS_renameat2("/mp/dir/file", "/mp/dir/whiteout", RENAME_WHITEOUT) 2. Consume out of space before kernel(mdelay) doing budget for whiteout Fix it by doing whiteout space budget before locking ubifs inodes. BTW, it also fixes wrong goto tag 'out_release' in whiteout budget error handling path(It should at least recover dir i_size and unlock 4 ubifs inodes). | ||||